



## RELATÓRIO FINAL

### **VIII Conferência Interparlamentar sobre a Política Externa e de Segurança Comum e a Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PESC/PCSD)**

**6 a 8 de abril de 2016, Haia - Holanda**

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and  
the Common Security and Defence Policy

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The Hague, The Netherlands



## **RELATÓRIO**

### **VIII CONFERÊNCIA INTERPARLAMENTAR SOBRE POLÍTICA EXTERNA E DE SEGURANÇA COMUM / POLÍTICA COMUM DE SEGURANÇA E DEFESA (PESC / PCSD)**

**RIDDERZAAL, HAIA, 6 A 8 DE ABRIL, 2016**

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## **I- Enquadramento Geral**

Sob os auspícios da Presidência holandesa do Conselho Europeu, decorreu nos passados dias 6 a 8 de abril, em Haia, a Conferência interparlamentar sobre a PESC/PCSD.

Esta Conferência, neste caso organizada sob a égide do Parlamento dos Países Baixos, tem uma periodicidade semestral, coincidindo a respetiva organização ao Parlamento do país detentor da presidência do Conselho. Resulta da decisão tomada na Conferência de Presidentes de Parلامentos da UE de 2012, em Varsóvia, na sequência da qual veio a ser acordada a institucionalização de uma Conferência Interparlamentar sobre a PESC/PCSD, corolário do princípio do reforço do papel dos Parلامentos nacionais, tanto na definição da Política externa e de Segurança da União, como no escrutínio do respetivo processo de decisão política.

## **II- Delegação Parlamentar Portuguesa**

A delegação parlamentar nacional teve a seguinte composição, de acordo com as Comissões Parlamentares Permanentes envolvidas:<sup>1</sup>

Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros e Comunidade Portuguesas (CNECP):

- .Deputado Sérgio Sousa Pinto (Presidente da CNECP), que chefiou a delegação;
- .Deputada Paula Teixeira da Cruz (PSD);

Comissão de Defesa Nacional (CDN):

- .Deputado José de Matos Correia (PSD);

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<sup>1</sup> A delegação parlamentar foi acompanhada pelo assessor da CNECP, Raul Maia Oliveira, e a representante permanente da AR junto da UE, Maria João Costa.

.Deputado Júlio Miranda Calha (PS);

Comissão de Assuntos Europeus (CAE):

Deputado Carlos da Costa Neves (PSD) e

..Deputado Vitalino Canas (PS).

### **III- Lista de Participantes.**

A Lista de Participantes é a que se encontra disponibilizada em <https://www.parleu2016.nl/source/92/32>.

Estiveram igualmente presentes Deputados do Parlamento Europeu dos diversos grupos políticos nele representados, bem como de parlamentares de países candidatos à UE, e de outros países que o solicitaram, na qualidade de observadores.

De entre os Parlamentos dos Estados membros da União, registou-se a ausência dos Parlamentos da Finlândia e da Croácia.

### **IV- Desenvolvimento dos Trabalhos.**

#### **Dia 6 de Abril**

##### **i. Reunião dos Chefes de Delegação dos Parlamentos do Sul**

Preliminarmente e a convite dos chefes das delegações grega, cipriota e italiana (cf. convite que se anexa), colocou-se a possibilidade de o chefe da delegação parlamen-

tar portuguesa participar num encontro informal e preparatório da própria conferência de Haia, com início apurado para as 14 horas do próprio dia de início dos trabalhos. Não obstante o interesse manifestado, não foi logisticamente possível participar neste encontro, dado o horário de chegada do voo da delegação nacional.

Contudo e já no decorrer dos trabalhos da Conferência, o chefe da delegação parlamentar grega, Presidente da Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros e Defesa do Parlamento Helénico, Costas Douzinas, na presença dos diversos elementos da delegação portuguesa, deu conta da decisão de constituir o “Grupo Med” e de organizar uma primeira reunião a realizar em Atenas, a concretizar posteriormente e em data a fixar, no sentido da concretização da criação de um Grupo informal de Chefes de Delegação à PESC/PCSD dos Parlamntos que correspondem ao Grupo Med governamental, que reúne os Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros de 7 Estados membros da área do Mediterrâneo com vista a partilhar posições sobre assuntos de relevante interesse comum, no âmbito da PESC/PCSD.

## **ii. Reunião de Chefes de Delegação**

De acordo com a agenda de trabalhos prevista,<sup>2</sup> a participação parlamentar portuguesa iniciou-se, pelas 17.30 do dia 6, com a reunião de chefes de delegação, na qual participou, nessa qualidade, o Senhor Presidente da Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros e Comunidades Portuguesas, Deputado Sérgio Sousa Pinto.

O Presidente da Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros do Senado dos Países Baixos, Nico Schrijver, começou a reunião por saudar os presentes e apresentar o programa da reunião. De seguida, informou sobre os resultados da reunião da troika e deu conta da proposta de conclusões preparada pela troika, que englobava algumas das propostas de alterações apresentadas pelas várias delegações. Informou ainda que todas as delegações tinham a nova versão da proposta de conclusões nas mesas.

A primeira intervenção coube ao Chefe de Delegação do Folketinget da Dinamarca, que começou por considerar que esta Conferência era um importante local para deba-

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<sup>2</sup> Disponível em <https://www.parleu2016.nl/c/32>

te interparlamentar, mas que tal não se deveria circunscrever ao debate sobre propostas de alterações às conclusões, devendo o debate focar os temas de fundo.

De igual modo, criticou que o texto que se pretendia debater nesta reunião tivesse tido uma nova versão apenas distribuída naquele momento, o que impossibilitava um debate sério. Sublinhou ainda que, nos termos do regulamento da Conferência, a existência de conclusões é facultativa, pelo que sugeriu às futuras Presidências que considerassem a possibilidade não existirem conclusões. Finalmente informou que o Parlamento Dinamarquês não iria votar favoravelmente estas conclusões, mas não iria também impedir a sua aprovação.

O Chefe de Delegação da House of Commons do Parlamento do Reino Unido interveio de seguida para subscrever a intervenção anterior e reiterar que o debate nesta Conferência deveria centrar-se nos temas e não nas conclusões e respetivas propostas de alteração.

O Chefe de Delegação do Parlamento da Grécia depois de uma breve análise da situação atual da União Europeia considerou que a proposta de conclusões é demasiado belicista e que os tempos atuais exigiam um texto mais pacifista. Acrescentou ainda que a guerra é a razão de existirem refugiados e é geradora de desigualdades. Finalmente referiu a importância de centrar o debate nos problemas que afetam a Europa e, nesse âmbito, deu os parabéns à Presidência pela inclusão da dimensão externa dos fluxos migratórios.

O Chefe de Delegação do Senado do Parlamento da Roménia referiu que as conclusões propostas pecam por não serem claras na mensagem política que deixam e que deveria ser dado mais ênfase à Estratégia Global da UE. No entanto, considerou que a sua delegação poderia apoiar o texto agora apresentado.

O Chefe de Delegação do Senado do Parlamento de Itália congratulou a *troika* pela proposta de conclusões apresentada. No entanto, informou que a sua delegação iria apresentar novamente uma proposta para que existisse uma referência à situação do cidadão italiano, Giulio Regenio, sublinhando a importância deste assunto. De igual modo, lamentou a falta de referências à Tunísia, o caso de sucesso da Primavera Árabe.

O Presidente da Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros do Senado dos Países Baixos explicou que a *troika* considerou que casos individuais não deveriam constar das Conclusões e que não era expectável mencionar todos os países à volta do Mediterrâneo. Aproveitou para identificar no texto da proposta de conclusões as várias alterações sugeridas pela delegação italiana e que tinham sido aceites.

A Chefe de Delegação do Riksdag da Suécia manifestou a sua oposição à referência nas conclusões do apoio à criação do quartel geral operacional da UE. Relativamente ao restante conteúdo das conclusões, demonstrou a sua concordância.

O Chefe de Delegação do Senado do Parlamento Francês sublinhou a importância de se chegar a um acordo sobre a proposta relativa à utilização dos dados dos registos de identificação dos passageiros (PNR) e à importância do combate ao tráfico de armas.

O Chefe de Delegação do Bundestag da Alemanha começou por enfatizar a necessidade de uma resposta europeia e o reforço da cooperação interparlamentar. Considerou que este não era o fórum para discutir NATO, mas sim União Europeia, tendo sublinhado a importância do investimento em investigação na área militar.

O Chefe de Delegação do Congresso de Espanha sublinhou a importância do Sul e os problemas que advêm dos vizinhos na fronteira Mediterrânica, sublinhando que estão a ser criadas condições, se nada for feito, para o surgimento de novos focos de fundamentalismo e de terrorismo. Aludiu à África subsariana e à necessidade de a Europa ter capacidade militar não apenas para defender o território, mas sobretudo os valores europeus.

O Chefe de Delegação do Parlamento Europeu referiu que a proposta de conclusões respeita as competências da UE e que nenhuma das crises que afeta a UE poderá ter uma resposta isolada. Referiu a importância de existir uma cooperação real entre os serviços secretos e que há 15 anos que não se chega a um acordo sobre a sua concretização – dando conta que apenas 5 Estados Membros prestam informações regulares à Eurojust e à Europol sobre, nomeadamente, o combate ao terrorismo. Finalmente defendeu a existência de um quartel geral operacional da EU por considerar que é a única forma da União poder operacionalizar, sem depender de estruturas de terceiros, as suas próprias operações.



Não existindo mais intervenções, a Presidência agradeceu todos os contributos e informou que poderiam ser apresentadas mais propostas de alterações até às 16h do dia seguinte, tendo então concluído a reunião.

Seguidamente, decorreram encontros no âmbito dos diferentes grupos políticos representados no Parlamento Europeu.

O dia 6 culminou com um jantar oferecido pelo Senhor Embaixador de Portugal nos Países Baixos, Ministro Plenipotenciário José Bouza Serrano, que decorreu na sua residência oficial, em Haia, para o qual foi convidada toda a delegação parlamentar portuguesa.

#### **Dia 7 de Abril**

Já no dia 7 de abril, teve lugar a sessão de abertura dos trabalhos, onde intervieram as entidades referidas na Agenda. Em termos procedimentais, a Mesa comunicou aos participantes o critério adotado para as intervenções dos participantes, limitadas a três minutos cada, sujeitas a prévia inscrição, durante o período para tal anunciado pela Mesa.

À margem dos trabalhos, foi disponibilizado aos participantes, a título puramente informativo, o Relatório Clingendael,<sup>3</sup> de abril de 2016, sobre a Dimensão Parlamentar da Cooperação na Defesa, o qual se encontra disponível em <https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/The%20Parliamentary%20Dimension%20of%20Defence%20Cooperation%20-%20April2016.pdf> , juntando-se igualmente cópia do mesmo.

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<sup>3</sup> Trata-se de um Relatório elaborado pelo *Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, sediado em Haia

A alocução proferida pela Senhora Karlijn Jans, Presidente da *Netherlands Atlantic Youth*, encontra-se disponível em <https://www.parleu2016.nl/c/32/a/1270> .

### iii- Sessão I

Nesta Sessão, foi transmitida na sala da Conferência uma comunicação video da Senhora Alta Representante da União para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança e Vice-Presidente da Comissão Europeia, Federica Mogherini, que não pôde marcar presença por motivos de incompatibilidades de agenda. Na sua mensagem, a Alta Representante começou por aludir à sua ausência desta reunião, por se encontrar em Adis-Abeba, no âmbito das relações EU/União Africana, de onde segue para Jacarta e Hiroxima, onde participa na reunião do G7. Dada a explicação vincou a relevância da presente iniciativa no contexto da participação dos diferentes Parlamentos nacionais no desenvolvimento e execução das políticas europeias no âmbito da PESC/PCSD e do reforço da própria cooperação interparlamentar que a Conferência potencia. Enunciou o paradoxo com que a Europa presentemente se confronta, dado que, perante ameaças à segurança \_ a crise dos refugiados e o terrorismo \_ que aconselham a um maior aprofundamento da intercolaboração entre todos, dá-se o caso de existirem opiniões públicas e algumas lideranças nacionais cujas posições, ao invés, tendem a promover um maior distanciamento entre todos, situação em que todos perdem. A solução dos problemas de segurança comum com que a Europa se debate só é possível com a participação integrada de todos, seja ao nível local, nacional ou europeu. E lembrou alguns êxitos recentes da política externa europeia, liderada pela própria União: na Síria, na crise dos refugiados e migrantes no Mediterrâneo, ainda, no caso da cooperação com África, onde a ideia de “Construir Parcerias” tem tido enorme sucesso, devendo mesmo constituir o *modus operandi* que a União deve privilegiar.

De seguida o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros holandês, o Senhor Bert Koenders (antigo Presidente da Assembleia Parlamentar da NATO) proferiu a sua alocução, tendo começado por aludir ao recentíssimo “chumbo” do Acordo de Associação com a Ucrânia, na sequência do Referendo interno holandês, aconselhando-se agora, se-

gundo opinou, uma estratégia *step by step*, tendo até em conta o facto de terem votado 32% dos eleitores, com 64% de votos “não”. Acrescentou que o euroceticismo reinante aconselha a um maior envolvimento dos cidadãos e instituições, de que a presente Conferência é bom exemplo. Neste contexto, preconizou um processo de decisão europeu melhor e mais rápido, o qual não pode deixar de conciliar-se com uma maior participação e escrutínio popular.

A finalizar, identificou quatro grandes desafios para a Europa. Primeiro, a necessidade de a Europa conseguir “exportar” estabilidade, sob pena de “importar” instabilidade, relembrando que as instituições PESC/PCSD foram criadas em tempos de calma generalizado, havendo agora que torna-las à prova de tempestades. Depois, salientado que o terrorismo não pode ser vencido apenas com recurso ao encerramento de fronteiras e ações militares, pois as condições de estabilidade devem em primeira linha obter-se local e regionalmente. Em terceiro lugar, a absoluta necessidade de um compromisso efetivo e atuante entre os 28 Estados-Membros, por ser isso que a população europeia espera das suas instituições. Finalmente, a necessidade de alterar o paradigma estratégico da União, com a aprovação de uma nova Estratégia Global, pondo em marcha os mecanismos introduzidos com o Tratado de Lisboa. Concluiu, veiculando as ideias do multilateralismo e da atuação integrada, exemplificando um conjunto de Acordos entretanto promovidos, por exemplo, com a Jordânia e a Turquia, que carecem agora de adequada implementação.

No debate que se seguiu, intervieram os Senhores **Deputados Carlos Costa Neves**, e **Júlio Miranda Calha**. No caso do Senhor **Deputado Costa Neves**, foi vincada a importância de que venha a ser aprovada em junho, na reunião do Conselho Europeu, a nova Estratégia Global, salientando a relevância desta em face quer do resultado negativo do Referendo holandês e dos seus reflexos na posição europeia relativamente à política de segurança a leste, quer das relações com África. Na sua intervenção o Senhor **Deputado Miranda Calha** colocou igualmente questões relacionadas a estratégia de segurança e de vizinhança a leste, e com as migrações e o terrorismo.

Intervieram, ainda (e por ordem sucessiva), representantes dos Paramentos/Câmaras da Hungria, Roménia, Reino Unido, Letónia, Albânia, França, República Checa, e alguns Deputados do Parlamento Europeu.

#### **iv- Sessão II**

A parte vespertina dos trabalhos iniciou-se com a alocução da Ministra da Defesa holandesa, Senhora Hennis-Plasschaert, e do Chefe de Estado-Maior de Defesa dos Países Baixos, General Tom Middendorp.

Na sua intervenção, a Senhora Hennis-Plasschaert salientou a participação de forças europeias na Somália, as sanções impostas à Federação Russa e o acordo celebrado com a Turquia, como ilustrativos do crescente papel e empenho da União em garantir condições para a sua segurança interna, afirmando, porém, que o atual momento exige mais em quantidade e qualidade. Elegeu 3 áreas de intervenção imediata: a aprovação, em junho, da nova Estratégia Global; estudo e implementação de políticas integradas de aquisição de equipamentos militares; necessidade de compromissos políticos à escala europeia, onde cada Parlamento nacional desempenha papel fulcral (relembrou a intenção da União em criar um *Battle Group* com prontidão de 48 horas). No respeitante à segunda área de intervenção, afirmou, no que foi secundada pelo General Middendorp, que se a União não agir outros agirão em seu lugar, lembrando existir de há tempo um Livro Branco sobre necessidades e capacidades em matéria de Defesa, onde é dado destaque à qualidade e inovação. Destacou o facto de a Holanda possuir já forças integradas com a Alemanha \_ unidades de paraquedistas e carros de combate \_, e que se apresta a implementar no âmbito do BENELUX um *air warning joint system*.

No debate que se seguiu, interveio o Senhor **Deputado Miranda Calha**, questionando acerca de qual deve ser o papel das forças armadas no combate ao terrorismo. Em resposta, o General Middendorp respondeu que se é certo que a resposta não pode ficar-se pela componente militar (realçou a componente financeira), já hoje os militares

holandeses participam em ações de controlo de fronteiras, busca em áreas interditas e em operações antiterrorismo. Referiu que na Holanda, um terço das forças armadas estão concretamente alocadas a missões de *homeland security*.

Intervieram, ainda, representantes dos Paramentos/Câmaras do Reino Unido, Macedónia, Bélgica, Espanha, Áustria, França, Alemanha, República Checa e Grécia, além de diversos Deputados ao Parlamento Europeu.

#### **v- Workshops Temáticos**

Nos termos agendados realizaram-se os três Workshops previstos, sujeitos a inscrição prévia. Cinco dos parlamentares portugueses participaram no *workshop* sobre o estado da arte do processo de revisão da Estratégia Global de Segurança (A). O Senhor Deputado Vitalino Canas participou no fora dedicado à política de migrações (B), não se tendo registado participação no *workshop* referente à exportação europeia de armas, pelo que a este propósito, nada se refere mais do que o documento de enquadramento, disponível em <https://www.parleu2016.nl/source/92/32> , e do qual se junta cópia ao presente Relatório.

#### **Workshop A**

Teve por base o documento previamente distribuído pela organização \_ que desde já se anexa \_ e que constava dos dossiê individual organizado pelos serviços e em tempo entregue a cada Deputado integrante da delegação parlamentar portuguesa. Neste documento fornecia-se uma visão esquemática das linhas fundamentais que orientam a nova Estratégia Global de Segurança (EGS).

O tema foi introduzido pela Senhora Nathalie Tocci, assessora especial da Alta Representante para os Negócios Estrangeiros e Segurança Comum, que explicou o teor, sentido e alcance do documento atrás mencionado. Salientou, de início, que a decisão interna de redefinir a EGS visa a produção de efeitos externos. Referiu cinco áreas de efeitos: (i) incremento do produto europeu de Segurança e Defesa, (ii) au-

mento da resiliência no leste europeu, (iii) maior capacidade de prevenção, gestão e estabilização de crises e conflitos, (iv) incremento de uma abordagem mais global, integrada e multilateral e, finalmente, (v) o previsível e desejável aumento dos orçamentos no presente âmbito, designadamente, para efeitos de aquisições de materiais e equipamentos, capacidades de ciberguerra, e cooperação e integração de *intelligence*.

Intervieram os Senhores **Deputados Costa Neves, e Sérgio Pousa Pinto**. O Senhor **Deputado Costa Neves** questionou acerca do prazo previsto para aprovação da EGS, de forma a que, em tempo útil, os parlamentos nacionais se possam convenientemente pronunciar. O Senhor **Deputado Sérgio Sousa Pinto** questionou a Senhora Tocci, na qualidade de presumível participante na definição desta nova Estratégia sobre qual a relevância geoestratégica que a Alta Representante atribuiu, no referido contexto, quer ao espaço Atlântico e à América do Sul \_ espaço histórico de expansão da própria cultura e civilização de raiz europeia \_, quer à região africana a sul da esfera de influência francófona, dado que, para ambos os casos, não ser possível encontrar no *draft* apresentado quaisquer referências a tal propósito. Caso tal omissão seja intencional, perguntou, ainda, o Senhor **Deputado Sérgio Sousa Pinto**, se tal entendimento relativamente ao continente sul-americano resulta do reconhecimento pela União do interesse dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e, relativamente à questão africana, se a União tem consciência do interesse que tal território suscita à China e se conseguia antecipar, em consonância, as consequências da visão estratégica europeia apresentada.

Em resposta, foi referido, apenas, que a geografia é importante e que a União existindo áreas de África mais importantes para o interesse da União do que outras. Quanto à questão sul-americana, foi referido que a União continua a ter uma relação de proximidade com este continente, através da participação em organizações e instituições comuns.

Nesta sequência, intervieram ainda parlamentares da Roménia e do Reino Unido, bem como da Senhora Deputada ao Parlamento Europeu, Ana Gomes.

Seguidamente, tomou a palavra a Senhora Alliot-Marie, em representação do Partido Popular Europeu. Começou por salientar a sensação, interna e exterior à União, de que não existe uma política externa europeia em matéria de Segurança e Defesa. Afirmou que não tem sido dada relevância a certas tensões interétnicas na África subsariana, bem como a leste da Europa, mas aqui, por motivos relacionados com a energia e o acesso a água potável. Aludiu, ainda, à tensão religiosa como motivação de um novo terrorismo, pondo em conflito duas visões diferentes do mundo. Constata pretender a Europa assumir-se como “poder global”, duvidando de que possua capacidades para tal, num quadro em que os EUA se têm desligado de tal função. Independentemente de se saber se esta falta de capacidade europeia se deve a motivos económicos, militares ou de afirmação política de certos valores, a política de Segurança e Defesa comum é essencial, pelo que deve ser devidamente valorizada pelas instâncias europeias e pelos diferentes Estados-Membros. Daí a essencialidade em criar um Quartel-General da União Europeia que, no seu entendimento, não é incompatível com as atribuições atuais do SHAPE,<sup>4</sup> residindo o problema na questão financeira, pois são poucos os países que cumprem as contribuições a que estão obrigadas no âmbito da NATO.

### **Workshop B**

O Secretário-Geral Adjunto do Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa para os assuntos globais e económicos, Christian Leffler, iniciou a sua intervenção referindo que atualmente é impossível dissociar o fenómeno migratório com o Mar Mediterrâneo e a situação na Síria, no entanto, se é verdade que as situações de conflito têm repercussões nos países vizinhos, o fenómeno migratório é muito mais vasto e atinge outros pontos do Globo. Recordou que, no Outono, o Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas convocou uma reunião sobre este tema, alertando para que na génese das migrações nem sempre se encontram conflitos, no sentido tradicional, mas também razões económicas, alterações climáticas, razões sociais e políticas. Recentrando a sua intervenção na União Europeia, considerou que em 2015 foram atingidos níveis extraordinários de migrações irregulares e que a União tem apresentado medidas com vista a enfrentar os desafios, tentando interligar a componente interna e a externa.

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<sup>4</sup> Abreviatura de Supreme Headquarter for Allied Power in Europe.

Neste último âmbito realçou os programas de cooperação com os países parceiros, os pacotes financeiros com países de África e Ásia (no âmbito da política de apoio ao desenvolvimento) e as cimeiras bilaterais ou conferências internacionais, que permitem sentar à mesma mesa países de origem e destino dos fluxos migratórios. Uma última palavra relativa ao apoio da EU para a estabilização da Líbia, não apenas através do papel ativo nas negociações com, presentemente, apoiando o governo de unidade nacional.

A Diretora Geral Adjunta do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Turquia responsável pelas migrações, asilo e vistos Esen Altug, centrou a sua intervenção no acordo entre a Turquia e a UE, começando por recordar que a Turquia é um país de trânsito, mas também de destino dos migrantes, existindo atualmente cerca de 3 milhões de refugiados na Turquia. Salientou que, desde 2011, a Turquia tem cooperado com todos os parceiros e tem mantido uma porta aberta para os refugiados sem discriminação e garantindo: (i.) proteção e assistência; (ii.) assistência mesmo fora dos centros de acolhimentos; (iii.) em estreita cooperação com as ONGs no terreno. Acrescentou que, na Turquia, existem atualmente 350 centros de acolhimento, que acolhem cerca de 270.000 refugiados, encontrando-se os restantes 2,5 milhões de refugiados a viver em diversas cidades turcas. Realçou ainda que o Governo Turco gastou mais de 2 mil milhões de dólares em assistência médica e comida para os refugiados e que 350.000 crianças refugiadas frequentam as escolas turcas (o que confessou ser insuficiente, pois estimam-se existir mais 400.000 crianças em idade escolar, que neste momento não têm vagas nas escolas). Deu conta ainda que existem cerca de 8.000 pedidos, em média, por dia, para os centros de acolhimento e que já nasceram cerca de 150.000 crianças de pais refugiados na Turquia desde o início do conflito na Síria.

Por último aludiu ao Acordo e Plano de Ação UE–Turquia, que afirmou ter passado a desempenhar um papel crucial, tendo aludido aos objetivos e ao cumprimento pela Turquia das medidas previstas.

No âmbito do debate, a delegação do Parlamento da Grécia aludiu à recusa de participação de vários Estados Membros no esquema de recolocação de refugiados e



suscitou reservas sobre o Acordo UE-Turquia e sobre os resultados práticos da intervenção da NATO no Mar Egeu. A delegação parlamentar da Noruega recordou a Convenção de Genebra e sublinhou a importância de garantir educação para os refugiados, interligando isso com a capacidade de participação no futuro dos seus países quando regressarem. A delegação parlamentar da Letónia sublinhou o drama das crianças não acompanhadas e a falta de condições nos centros de acolhimento.

A delegação parlamentar da Dinamarca referiu a necessidade de distinguir os migrantes económicos dos refugiados, enquanto a delegação parlamentar italiana defendeu a necessidade de rever o Regulamento de Dublin.

A delegação do Parlamento Europeu agradeceu à Turquia a sua disponibilidade para cooperar e lamentou que Estados Membros não adotem atitudes semelhantes no âmbito da crise de refugiados. De igual modo, questionou a representante do Governo Turco sobre as expectativas de fluxos migratórios provenientes do Irão e suscitou dúvidas sobre o processo de registo de refugiados, bem como da eventual diferença de tratamento entre sírios e iraquianos.

A delegação parlamentar da Eslovénia criticou a implementação de Schengen, sublinhando que os relatórios oficiais alertavam para as falhas existentes e criticando o Parlamento Europeu por não ter fiscalizado a Comissão Europeia neste âmbito. Relativamente ao Regulamento de Dublin, considerou que antes de pensar em rever, dever-se-ia fazer uma avaliação da sua implementação.

A delegação parlamentar do Reino Unido começou por aludir à diminuição de contribuições para o Programa da ONU de luta contra a fome, defendendo uma correlação entre aqueles que são responsabilizáveis e aqueles que devem fazer um esforço maior para receber os refugiados. Por último, demonstrou que o debate sobre a adesão da Turquia não deve ser misturado com a questão dos refugiados.

O Senhor **Deputado Vitalino Canas** interveio para sublinhar que Portugal apoia uma resposta conjunta da União Europeia e que todos os Estados Membros devem recordar e respeitar o princípio da solidariedade. No entanto, considerou que se pode fazer mais e, nesse âmbito, referiu que Portugal disponibilizou-se para receber mais refugiados do que aqueles que lhe cabiam no âmbito do esquema de recolocação.

Partilhou ainda preocupação pelo tempo que demora a recolocação de refugiados e questionou os oradores sobre o que pode ser feito para acelerar o processo. Questionou ainda a necessidade de rever o Regulamento de Dublin e em que aspetos. No que diz respeito à intervenção da NATO no Mar Egeu, solicitou esclarecimentos sobre a avaliação das primeiras semanas e se está previsto o alargamento da operação a outras áreas do mediterrâneo, nomeadamente, para uma futura necessidade ao largo da Líbia.

A Senhora Deputada ao Parlamento Europeu, Ana Gomes (S&D), referiu que na última deslocação à Grécia viu situações piores nos campos de acolhimento da Grécia do que em campos de acolhimento no Sudão. Criticou a rigidez da Comissão Europeia relativamente a questões orçamentais e financeiras, comparada com a flexibilidade com que encara a reação dos Estados Membros de Visegrad, que minaram o sistema de Schengen e colocam em causa os valores europeus. Recordou ainda que o Canadá recebeu 25000 refugiados.

No final do debate, a Diretora Geral Adjunta do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Turquia responsável pelas migrações, asilo e vistos, começou por explicitar que serão protegidos todos os sírios que, não tendo direito ao asilo, regressem ao abrigo do acordo da UE-Turquia. Informou ainda que os regressos voluntários são monitorizados pela UNHCR<sup>5</sup> e que as pessoas, que são obrigadas a reforçar são verificadas pelas organizações internacionais. Relativamente ao processo para atribuição de asilo, considerou que era o tempo necessário para aferir claramente se se tratavam de migrantes económicos ou refugiados, salientando que no caso afegão trata-se sobretudo de migrantes económicos.

O Secretário-Geral Adjunto do Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa para os assuntos globais e económicos, começou por concordar que existiram falhas na implementação de algumas medidas da UE e que a recolocação tem um procedimento complexo e que demora tempo. Concordou ainda com a necessidade de distinguir refugiados e migrantes. No entanto, relativamente aos refugiados recordou que a obrigação de temporariamente dar asilo remonta à Convenção de Genebra de 1951. Enfatizou que o sistema de Schengen tem falhas, mas que é um sucesso para as pessoas e bens e que os terroristas não são estrangeiros, são europeus.

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<sup>5</sup> Abreviatura de *United Nations High Commissionair for Refugies*, correspondente, em português, ao ACNUR \_ Alto Comissariado das Nações Unidas para os Refugiados.

## **Dia 8 de Abril**

### **vi- Sessão III**

Os trabalhos do dia 8 de abril iniciaram-se com a alocução<sup>6</sup> do Secretário-Geral Adjunto da NATO, Senhor Alexander Verbshtaw, seguida de debate.

Neste, interveio o senhor Deputado Vitalino Canas para questionar sobre se, no entendimento da NATO, a criação de um quartel-general operacional da União Europeia não constituiria uma duplicação funcional e se tal decisão, sobre cuja necessidade duvida, não equivaleria a uma redução na participação da NATO neste quadro de responsabilidades.

Em resposta, a entidade em apreço eximiu-se, de emitir uma opinião, tendo no entanto referido que, presentemente, apenas 4 países membros da NATO cumprem com a despesa em matéria de defesa a que estão obrigados no referido âmbito, i.e, 2% do respetivo Produto Interno Bruto. Mais referiu poder a Europa vir a desempenhar um importante papel em diversos tipos de missões e crises.

As demais intervenções incidiram, por um lado, na já aludida questão da duplicação de funções entre a NATO e a União, igualmente levantadas por parlamentares do Reino Unido e alguns Deputados ao Parlamento Europeu e, por outro, a questão da política da NATO para o leste europeu, designadamente, perante a ameaça russa, aspeto que é fundamental para os países da União, fronteiriços da Federação da Rússia. Tanto Deputados dos Parlamentos da Letónia como a Lituânia, afirmaram expressamente ter já disponibilizado aos EUA e à NATO portos de águas profundas nos respetivos territórios de forma a albergar duradouramente a presença de forças navais. Ainda sobre esta última questão intervieram representantes dos Parlamentos da Hungria e da Roménia.

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<sup>6</sup> Disponível em anexo ao presente Relatório, e em <https://www.parleu2016.nl/c/32/a/1351>

#### **vii- Sessão IV**

Esta sessão, inicialmente dedicada a uma intervenção da Secretária-Geral Adjunta para os Assuntos Políticos, do Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa, acabou por ser substituída pela imprevista participação (e alocução) do Primeiro-Ministro dos Países Baixos, Senhor Mark Rutte.<sup>7</sup>

No debate que se seguiu, interveio o **Senhor Deputado Miranda Calha**, para perguntar, em primeiro lugar que tipo de relação existe entre o recente “chumbo” do Acordo da União com a Ucrânia, após o Referendo holandês, e a posição política holandesa relativamente à situação naquele país; e, em segundo lugar, se o resultado do mencionado Referendo poderá ainda ter alguma ligação com o Espaço Schengen e a crise de refugiados e migrantes.

Em resposta, referiu o Primeiro-Ministro holandês que as questões levantadas são diferentes entre si não tendo qualquer ligação, afirmando que a leitura que faz do resultado do Referendo tem mais a ver com a reação dos holandeses à suscetibilidade de a assinatura do referido Acordo poder significar uma etapa para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia, quando tal questão nunca esteve em causa.

#### **V- Encerramento dos Trabalhos**

Seguidamente, sob a direção do Senhor Presidente da Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros do Senado dos Países Baixos, Nico Schijver, procedeu-se ao debate das propostas de alteração ao texto consensualizado na reunião de Chefes de Delegação apresentadas por 9 Parlamentos nacionais e pelo Parlamento Europeu. Foi possível chegar a um consenso relativamente às propostas de alteração apresentadas, no entanto, o parágrafo 6 suscitou um intenso debate sobre o estabelecimento de um

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<sup>7</sup> Discurso que se anexa ao presente Relatório, encontrando-se igualmente disponível em <https://www.parleu2016.nl/c/32/a/1363>

Quartel-general permanente da UE. A versão final das Conclusões<sup>8</sup>, acolhe a formulação consensualizada que refere que tal apenas ocorrerá no quadro dos Acordos da NATO denominados “Berlim Plus”.

## **VI- Considerações Finais:**

Do balanço desta Conferência, considera o Chefe da Delegação, que:

1. A centralidade temática desta Conferência, atenta a natureza das principais questões levantadas pelos diferentes participantes e as matérias objeto dos contactos informais que normalmente são estabelecidos em eventos como o presente, parece ter residido na nova Estratégia Global de Política Externa e de Segurança (abreviadamente, Estratégia Global ou simplesmente, EG) da União, a adotar, previsivelmente, na reunião de final de junho do Conselho Europeu, em Bruxelas.
2. É de realçar, no contexto da política externa da União, o elevado receio (e a correspondente pressão não só sobre a Europa, como sobre os Estados Unidos e a NATO) manifestado pelos países da ex-URSS relativamente à política externa e de vizinhança protagonizada pela Federação da Rússia, clima adensado pelo resultado do referendo holandês sobre o Acordo de Cooperação da União com a Ucrânia.
3. A partir deste tema central, constatou-se:

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<sup>8</sup> De que se junta um exemplar para conveniente comparação com o texto final adotado e igualmente disponibilizado em <https://www.parleu2016.nl/source/92/32>

- 3.1 Existir uma aparente opção Europeia por mais e melhores respostas, privilegiando as militares, cuja prioridade parece estar no desenvolvimento de uma força militar europeia (*Battle Group e European HQ*).
- 3.2 Existirem muitas dúvidas e incertezas relativamente à conciliação da ambição atrás mencionada com o papel desempenhado pela NATO no mesmo domínio, relevando, fundamentalmente, neste último aspeto:
- as dificuldades orçamentais sentidas em muitos Estados-membros da União;
  - as (sub)capacidades técnicas europeias em matéria de Defesa (organização, meios, equipamentos e sua inter-coadunabilidade);
  - as dúvidas que ressaltam relativamente à duplicação de funções face à NATO (manifestadas essencialmente pelo Reino Unido e secundadas por Portugal e pela Espanha), cuja consequência poderá passar pela diminuição da participação americana para a segurança na Europa.
- 4 Permaneceu por clarificar, atento o *timing* previsto para a aprovação da EG, que tipo de escrutínio poderá sobre esta recair, ainda, por parte dos diferentes Parlamentos nacionais.
- 5 Com interesse direto para Portugal, a aparente irrelevância a que a EG parece votar os assuntos relacionados com a África sub-equatorial (com exceção da República Democrática do Congo) e América do sul, matérias que não estão refletidas na ambição sumariamente exposta para a referida Estratégia.
- 6 Finalmente, embora não vertida nas conclusões da Conferência, perpassou a ideia \_ e a correspondente conformação por parte dos países visados \_, de não existirem condições políticas e financeiras, nos tempos mais próximos, para conduzir e/ou concluir novos processos de adesão à União Europeia (o caso Turco tem contornos particulares que não cabe aqui ajuizar, embora seja distinto de outros, como por exemplo, os da Albânia, Sérvia e Montenegro).



O Chefe da Delegação Parlamentar  
(Presidente da Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros e  
Comunidades Portuguesas)

(Sérgio Sousa Pinto)

## CADERNO DE ANEXOS

- A. Convite “Grupo Med”
- B. Agenda de Trabalhos
- C. Nota de enquadramento sobre a nova Estratégia Global de Segurança da União Europeia
- D. Discurso do Secretário-Geral Adjunto da NATO, Senhor Alexander Verbshaw
- E. Discurso do Primeiro Ministro dos Países Baixos, Senhor Mark Rutte
- F. Nota de Enquadramento sobre Exportação Europeia de Armas
- G. *Draft* de Declaração Final (14 de março)
- H. Declaração Final adotada
- I. Relatório *Clingaendel*





A

**Convite "Grupo Med"**



**Heads of Delegations  
of the Parliaments of the EU South  
to the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP and CSDP.**

Dear Colleague,

In view of the forthcoming Inter-parliamentary Conference on CFSP CSDP, the Chairpersons of the Cypriot, Hellenic and Italian Parliamentary Committees of Foreign Affairs and Defense would like to take the initiative to call an informal meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Parliaments of the European South, in order to evaluate the current situation and to discuss future challenges affecting the Mediterranean countries.

The meeting will take place on Wednesday the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 2016, in the plenary hall of the Senate from 14.00-15.00.

We propose to stick to the limited 1+1 format for this Meeting, in keeping with the idea of informality and easier exchanges, inviting therefore the Head of each Delegation or his/her substitute, plus one member of staff. We would appreciate your earliest possible response, so as to help us with logistics.

Looking forward to your presence at this Meeting, we would like to seize this opportunity, dear Colleague, to convey our friendliest regards.

**Giorgos VARNAVA,**  
Chairman of the Committee on Defence Affairs,  
House of Representatives of the Republic of  
Cyprus.

**Konstantinos DOUZINAS,**  
Chairman of the Standing Committee  
on National Defence and Foreign Affairs of the  
Hellenic Parliament

**Hon. Fabrizio CICCHITTO**  
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign and  
European Affairs  
Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament

**Hon. Francesco Saverio GAROFANI**  
Chairman of the Committee on Defence  
Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament



**B**

## **Agenda de Trabalhos**



# Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP)

6 - 8 April 2016, The Hague

## Draft programme

### Wednesday, 6 april 2016

- 14.00 - 16.00 Arrival of delegations and registration for the event at the hotels
- 15.45 - 16.45 **Meeting of the Representatives of the Presidency Troika and the European Parliament (venue: Plenary Hall, Senate)**
- 17.30 - 18.30 Meeting of the heads of delegation (venue: Plenary Hall, Senate)
- Chair: **Mr Nico Schrijver**
- 17.30 - 18.30 Fringe meeting on best practices in the civilian realm of CSDP, organised by **Ms Doris Wagner** of the German Bundestag (venue: Gravenkamer, Senate)
- 18.30 - 19.15 Meetings of the political groups (venue: committee meeting rooms, Senate.  
Please note: no opportunity to return to the hotels before dinner)
- 19.15 - 19.30 **Transfer to Dinner location**
- 19.30 - 22.30 **Cocktail dinner hosted by the President of the Senate, Ms Ankie Broekers-Knol, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ms Khadija Arib**

### Thursday, 7 april 2016

- 07.00 - 07.30 Morning run (departure from the conference hotels)
- 08.30 Welcome with coffee (venue: Hall of Knights)
- 09.00 **Opening session**
- Chair: **Ms Angeliën Eijssink**
- Welcome by the President of the Senate **Ms Ankie Broekers-Knol**
  - Keynote address by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, **Mr Elmar Brok**
  - Address by the chairwoman of the Netherlands Atlantic Youth, **Ms Karlijn Jans**
- 10.00 - 10.45 Family Photo and Coffee break

10.45 - 12.00    **Session I**

Chair: **Ms Angelien Eijsink**

Video message by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy /  
Vice-President of the European Commission, **Ms Federica Mogherini**

Presentation followed by debate with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the  
Netherlands, **Mr Bert Koenders**

12.00 - 13.30    Lunch (venue: Rolzaal and Kelderzaal)

13.30 - 15.00    **Session II**

Chair: **Mr Frank van Kappen**

Presentation followed by debate with the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,  
**Ms Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert** and the Chief of Staff of the Netherlands, **General Tom Middendorp**

15.00 - 15.30    Coffee break

15.30 - 15.45    Transfer on foot to the House of Representatives

15.45 - 17.15    Parallel workshops (venue: committee meeting rooms, House of Representatives)

**Workshop A**    "**State of play for the Global Security Strategy review**"

Moderator: **Mr Frits Lintmeijer**

Rapporteur: **Mr František Šebej**

Speakers:

- **Ms Nathalie Tocci**, Special Advisor to High Representative/Vice-president Mogherini on the EU Global Security Strategy / **Mr Alfredo Conte**, Head of Strategic Planning Division, European External Action Service
- **Ms Michèle Alliot-Marie**, Member of the European Parliament for the EPP

**Workshop B**    Foreign policy aspects of migration

Moderator: **Mr Henri Kox**

Rapporteur: **Mr Ioan Mircea Pascu**

Speakers:

- **Mr Christian Leffler**, Deputy Secretary General for Global and Economic Issues, European External Action Service
- **Ms Esen Altug**, Deputy Director-General for Migration, Asylum and Visas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey



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**Workshop C European arms exports**

Moderator: **Ms Maria Martens**

Rapporteur: **Ms Bodil Valero**

**Speakers:**

- **Mr Rini Goos**, Deputy Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency
- **Mr Jacek Bylica**, EU Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament, European External Action Service

17.30 - 18.00 Presentation of Workshop results and wrap-up

Chair: **Mr Frank van Kappen**

(venue: Hall of Knights)

19.30 - 20.00 Reception and aperitif at Dinner locations

20.00 - 22.30 **Members' Dinner (venue: Oude Zaal, House of Representatives, Members only)**  
**Hosted by the Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Ms Angeliën Eijssink, and the Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation of the Senate, Mr Nico Schrijver**

20.00 - 22.30 **Staff dinner (venue: Beergarden, Rond de Grote Kerk 8, The Hague, staff only)**

## Friday 8 April

08:00 - 08:45 **Meeting of the troika (venue: Plenary Hall, Senate)**

08.30 - 09.00 Welcome with coffee (venue: Hall of Knights)

09.00 - 10.15 Session III

Chair: **Mr Nico Schrijver**

Presentation followed by debate with the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, **Mr Alexander Vershbow**

10.15 - 10.45 Coffee break

10.45 - 12.15 Session IV

Presentation followed by debate with Ms Helga Schmid, Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, European External Action Service (tbc)

Chair: **Mr Nico Schrijver**



**Interparliamentary Conference for the  
Common Foreign and Security Policy  
and the Common Security and Defence  
Policy (CFSP/CSDP)**

**6 - 8 April 2016, The Hague**

12.15 - 12.45 Adoption of conclusions and closure of meeting

Chair: **Mr Nico Schrijver**

12.45 - 14.15 Lunch (venue: Rolzaal and Kelderzaal)

14.15 Departure of delegations



C

**Nota de enquadramento sobre a nova  
Estratégia Global de Segurança da União Europeia**



## EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy: Annotated Outline

### 1. Why an EU Global Strategy?

- Geographically global with a strong regional focus in our surrounding regions
- Thematically global with a strong security focus

### 2. An EU Global Strategy to Promote EU interests

The first three interests are predominantly internal with strong external implications. The fourth interest is predominantly external and is the precondition for fulfilment of the first three:

- Security of EU citizens and territory and the ensuing interest in peaceful surrounding regions, as well as to prevent and tackle the root causes of conflict (climate change, development, resources, etc).
- Prosperity of the EU and its citizens and the ensuing interest in an open international economic system and global governance fit to meet global challenges
- Resilience of EU democracies, which conditions how the EU acts internally, in the internal/external nexus (e.g., migration), as well as externally (e.g., in the accession process, in the response to mass atrocities, more broadly in relations with all external actors)
- A rules based global order, based on international law, to ward off power politics, provide global public goods, and contribute to a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world.

### 3. The Principles of an EU Global Strategy

- Engagement in a More Connected World. There is no draw-bridge into Europe. The EU must reach out and engage.
- Responsibility in a More Contested World: There is no magic wand to solve conflicts. The EU must prevent conflict, do no harm, facilitate local and regional agreements, commit long-term, and tackle the root causes of conflict.
- Working together in a More Complex World: both internally between institutions and MS (unity of purpose and unity in action) and externally with partners of first resort (US, NATO, UN, etc) and through functional/transactional partnering in line with EU interests.

These principles stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration for a peaceful transition towards a new rules-based global order. In charting the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of interventionism, the EU must engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contingency. Pragmatic idealism will guide the EU Global Strategy in the years ahead.

#### 4. The Priorities of the EU Global Strategy

- **The resilience of the European Union and its Member States.** The Global strategy starts at home: the resilience of the EU and its MS. Internally work is being done (energy union, digital agenda, agenda on migration), but more needed in security/defence terms: defence/deterrence, counter-terrorism/CVE, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, external energy security, cyber security, external border management and external migration policy.
- **The resilience of states and societies in surrounding regions.** Within the remit of enlargement – countries in the strategic front-yard of the EU – the EU has a special advantage that must be used to ensure reforms regain momentum. A strict and fair accession process featuring greater scrutiny of reforms, clearer reform requirements, and credible feedback from EU peers is essential. Beyond enlargement and in countries to east (Afghanistan westwards) and south (DRC northwards) resilience is also key and fragility manifests in different ways (refugees, corruption, terrorism, border security, development, marginalization, radicalization, terrorism) and must be tackled through tailor made mixes.
- **Integrated approach to conflict and crisis:** At times – Libya, Syria, Somalia – the state has already imploded. In such cases the EU must complement work undertaken at international-national level to recreate the central state, with greater efforts at the local level (local ceasefires and security zones, fostering legitimate livelihoods at the local level, fostering inclusive local governance). It must also reinvest in conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding.
- **Investing in regional security.** Local conflicts increasingly have a broader regional overlay and the absence of functioning and inclusive regional processes is both a cause and a consequence of conflict. In areas where such regional mechanisms exist (Africa, Americas) they have proven able to deliver public goods. The EU will invest in regional security in all four cardinal directions:
  - East:
    - Eastern partnership countries
    - EU-Russia relations
    - EU-Asia relations including Central Asia, China, and East/South-East Asia (notably ASEAN).
  - South:
    - Old and new conflicts in the MENA region: Iran-Gulf engagement strategy; Syria/Libya multilateral processes; Quartet and Arab partners. Aim: supporting and fostering the space for diplomacy
    - Supporting regional dialogue/cooperation in the broader MENA region on functional issues (climate, CT/CVE, etc)
    - Turkey's regional role: blending the accession process with strategic cooperation

- African regional security: AU, sub-regional organisations, and wider connections with MENA dynamics
  - West:
    - Reinvigorating the transatlantic relationship (TTIP, NATO, other)
    - Cooperation in the wider Atlantic space
  - North: Arctic cooperation
- **Strengthening Global Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.** The EU remains deeply committed to the multilateral system, of which the UN is the lynchpin. Yet this commitment can no longer translate in an aim to preserve the existing system. In some areas, governance mechanisms exist but must be reformed in order to deliver global public goods and better reflect the changing realities of the international system. In other areas, notably those on the frontiers of 21<sup>st</sup> century world affairs, new governance mechanisms must be fostered and created. The recipes for their establishment will vary. They may imply the creation of new global institutions, the broadening remits of existing ones, the establishment of informal and inclusive multilateral mechanisms, or issue-specific initiatives undertaken at mini-lateral, regional or inter-regional levels. The EU will strive for effective global governance, actively and patiently seeking to reform, broaden or pioneer multilateral mechanisms across different policy areas with a view to strengthening a rules-based order fit to deliver global public goods.

#### 4. Implications

Pulling the threads together and drawing implications regarding

- Resources and capacities (e.g., defence, cyber, counter-terrorism)
- Institutions (coherence between policy instruments and institutions, coordination between the EU and MS)
- Ways of working (greater flexibility and responsiveness in a world of predictable unpredictability)



D

**Discurso do Secretário-Geral Adjunto da NATO, Senhor Alexander Verbshaw**

**NATO Deputy Secretary General's remarks at  
The European Union Inter-Parliamentary Committee meeting  
8 April 2016, The Hague**

Thank you, Mr. Schrijver, for that kind introduction. It is a pleasure to be here today to address such a distinguished group of parliamentarians from across the European Union. The bridge you provide between organisations like the EU and NATO, and the people you represent, is one of the great things about our societies. Open debate and democratic accountability are as essential to our security as any forces that our nations can bring to bear.

The relationship between the European Union and NATO has rarely been closer, and it has never been as important as it is now. NATO and the EU share many things. Twenty-two EU member states, and nine out of every ten people in the EU enjoy the protection of the NATO Alliance. We share the same values: freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and for the rule of law.

We also share the same notion that, when we stand together, we are more than just the sum of our parts. We know that the nations of the EU and of NATO are stronger, safer and more prosperous when we stand united than when we stand apart.

As we look around us, in almost every direction we see a host of complex challenges, many of which pose a direct threat to our long-term safety, security and prosperity. Indeed, it is the most challenging security environment that Europe and the transatlantic community have faced since the height of the Cold War.

Right now, the headlines are dominated by the war in Syria and the growing instability across North Africa and the Middle East, which pose a serious threat to our own security, stability and cohesion. After Syria descended into civil war, terrorist organisations like ISIL (or Daesh) were quick to occupy large swathes of Syria and Iraq, with the aim of building a caliphate based on violence and a twisted version of Islam.

The humanitarian catastrophe that has ensued has left hundreds of thousands dead, while millions have fled in search of safety. While most remain in the region, many

have sought refuge on European shores. I don't have to tell you about the impact of so many people – desperate and in need – arriving in such a short space of time.

This is one area where NATO and the EU are working together. Our remits, our experiences and our expertise may be different, but they are also complementary. The direct response to the refugee crisis is primarily for national governments and the EU, but NATO is also playing a role. When NATO Defence Ministers met in February, they agreed to send ships to the Aegean to assist with the refugee and migrant crisis. They were deployed immediately and are now supporting the Greek and Turkish authorities as well as Frontex through the provision of maritime surveillance aimed at helping to halt illegal smuggling of migrants and refugees.

In addition to our efforts to manage the effects of the crisis, NATO is also working to address its root causes. Every NATO Ally is part of the US-led Coalition against ISIL. While this is not a NATO-led operation, the success of the Coalition in reversing ISIL's gains is in large part due to the ability of so many different nations to work together, a skill gained through years of challenging NATO operations from the Balkans to Afghanistan.

The ceasefire currently in place in Syria is holding, and I urge all parties to move towards a sustainable peace and a successful transition. Putting an end to the civil war will also enable the entire international community to focus all its energies on destroying ISIL and discrediting its extremist ideology.

Success in stabilizing the region will not be achieved by external forces imposing order, but by local nations gaining the strength and capacity to defend themselves from terror and insurgency, and ensuring that the safety, freedom and rights of their own people are put above all other considerations. NATO and the EU both have a role to play here.

Both our organisations have a history of working in the region to build our partners' capacity, be it in the military, political or economic realm. NATO has been assisting our southern neighbours with their defence reforms for more than two decades as part of the Mediterranean Dialogue, and we have been working almost as long with partners in the Gulf as part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. At our Summit in Wales two years ago, we launched our more ambitious Defence Capacity

Building initiative, and we are now implementing tailored support packages for several partners, including Jordan and Iraq.

Our support package with Jordan includes a focus on training, as well as assistance in areas as diverse as information protection and cyber defence, harbour protection, defence-related border security, and cooperation on countering Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs.

Jordan is also playing an important part in our support to Iraq. Just last week, we began training Iraqi armed forces at the King Abdullah II Special Operation Forces Training Centre in Jordan. Counter-IED, demining, military medicine, and civil military planning are among the key areas of our support. All these NATO efforts are being closely coordinated with the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

NATO's contributions are important, but we are not doing enough. If we want to have a strategic impact on the region, an impact that will contribute to our own security, then we need to significantly ramp-up our efforts. We need greater investment of time, energy and resources in our defence capacity building programs in the region. That is what I hope NATO leaders will agree to at our next Summit in Warsaw in July. And it is what I hope EU leaders will commit to when they meet in June, with a view to achieving greater synergy between NATO and EU efforts. By coordinating our capacity-building efforts, we can have greater success in halting the spread of violent extremism and stabilizing Europe's southern neighbourhood.

Unfortunately, we also need to pay equal attention to our Eastern neighbourhood. While NATO and the EU can take pride in their respective roles in building a Europe whole and free following the end of the Cold War, that vision is now being directly challenged by a revisionist Russia, a Russia that has turned its back on the years of cooperation and partnership with the West.

With its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has shown that it rejects the values, principles and structures jointly agreed in Europe in the form of the Helsinki Final act and numerous post-Cold War agreements. Russia now no longer wants to be integrated in a common Euro-Atlantic community; it wants to re-establish spheres of influence and is prepared to redraw borders by force toward that end. It has literally torn up the international rulebook. And all this is being justified by a false narrative

alleging that the West has sought deliberately to weaken, humiliate and take advantage of Russia for the past 25-30 years.

In declaring Yalta rather than Helsinki as the model for European security, Russia no longer accepts the sovereignty of its neighbours or the fundamental right of all nations to choose their own path. It occupies territory in Georgia and Moldova against the sovereign will of those governments. It has annexed Crimea and continues to use violence to destabilise Eastern Ukraine. And Russian ships and planes continue to test the resolve of NATO Allies by approaching – and even entering – NATO sovereign territory. The consequences of this, as we saw when Turkey downed the Russian jet last November, can be very serious indeed.

In response, NATO has embarked on the biggest increase in our collective defence since the Cold War. Allies have moved to halt further cuts in defence spending, with 16 Allies spending more last year than in 2014. One of those countries was the Netherlands. I very much welcome this move and the Dutch government's commitment to increase spending in real terms in the coming years. I also welcome its plan to spend 20% of that money on new equipment by the end of this decade.

But as the economy grows, spending will continue to fall as a percentage of GDP. The Netherlands can do more. In this regard, I am also encouraged by the debate here on multi-year defence budgets, which could bring much needed predictability to defence spending, essential for effective planning and defence investment decisions.

In addition to reversing the decline in defence spending, NATO is taking important steps to strengthen our defence posture in the face of a more aggressive Russia. Through our Readiness Action Plan, the Alliance has tripled the strength of the NATO Response Force to over 40,000 troops, with a rapid reaction Spearhead force able to deploy within 48 hours at its centre. We have put in place assurance measures along our eastern flank – in the air, at sea and on the ground – to underscore our determination to defend all allies.

At our Warsaw Summit in July, we will take further steps to strengthen our defence posture for the long term, moving from assurance to deterrence. A key decision at Warsaw will be to complement our rapid reinforcement capability with an enhanced forward presence within the eastern members of the Alliance. This will be based on



rotational deployments of capable, multinational forces. The aim is to ensure that any would-be aggressor understands that any incursion into Allied territory would be countered by forces from the whole Alliance – Americans, Europeans and home defence forces – and that any such aggression would be a mistake.

The United States has announced that it intends to quadruple its commitment to European security next year under the European Reassurance Initiative, with more troops, more training and exercises and more pre-positioned equipment on European soil. This will represent a huge contribution to NATO's enhanced forward presence, and I hope it will encourage European Allies to do their part.

Now, the challenge from Russia is not a straightforward military confrontation, it is far more subtle than that. Russia uses a wide range of tactics – from propaganda and cyber warfare to energy cut-offs and its infamous 'Little Green Men' – to achieve its political aims. These so-called 'hybrid' tactics are not new in themselves. But what is new are their scale, speed and intensity. Of course, we use many different means to achieve our objectives; the difference is that we use them to bring stability, freedom and prosperity, while Russia uses them to spread instability and fear.

Given the broad nature of hybrid warfare, both NATO and the EU are both working hard to thwart it. In their own ways, both organisations are seeking to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid warfare. But neither organisation has all the tools on its own. By combining our efforts, and by bringing to bear the full range of our civilian and military tools, we can have greater success in protecting our member states against hybrid aggression – again, making the impact of our efforts greater than the sum of its parts.

It is essential that NATO and the EU work together in areas such as improving our situational awareness, civil preparedness and resilience, cyber defence, and strategic communications. We must also test our capabilities and our resilience through joint training and exercises, so that should a crisis involving hybrid warfare arise, we each know what to do and whom to call on the other side of town.

By the time the EU and NATO leaders have their summit meetings this summer, I hope we can develop a common framework for our cooperation on hybrid warfare. We need a clearer understanding of where we are most effective working at the

national, EU or NATO level, and where it is essential that we combine our efforts to achieve the best outcome. On the basis of this understanding, we could perhaps agree on a common “playbook” that delineates responsibility for countering the different dimensions of hybrid warfare.

When it comes to collective defence and complex crisis response operations, NATO will always be the option of first resort. And there will always be areas – political and economic reform or development, for example – where the EU has the most appropriate skill mix. But at a time when our security and long-term prosperity is under such pressure, it makes sense for us to work together, to support each other and to achieve more together than we can alone. I am confident that this is exactly what we will do.

(2078 words)



E

**Discurso do Primeiro-Ministro dos Países Baixos, Senhor Mark Rutte**



Rijksoverheid

Mark Rutte

Minister-president, minister van Algemene Zaken

**Toespraak van minister-president Rutte bij de 8e interparlementaire conferentie over het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid en het gemeenschappelijk veiligheids- en defensiebeleid (GBVB/GVDB) op 8 april 2016 in Den Haag. Deze toespraak is alleen beschikbaar in het Engels.**

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen

It is an honour to be invited to speak to you at this interparliamentary conference on the security challenges Europe is currently facing.

Unfortunately, the organisers of this conference seem to have a great sense of timing: Europe is confronted with a multitude of security-related issues, on a scale we haven't seen since the end of the Cold War.

First and foremost, there is the terrorist threat, which again raised its ugly head in Brussels only two weeks ago, striking at Europe's very heart.

Then there is the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The protracted crisis in Syria, with all its humanitarian consequences. The highly unstable situation in Libya.

The mass migration flows that have been caused by these crises and are putting a strain on our societies. The threats to our cyber and nuclear security. And so on. It's not a list that makes one sleep well at night.

My colleagues Bert Koenders and Jeanine Hennis tell me you had a very lively debate yesterday. I won't cover the same ground here. Instead, let me begin by saying a few words on the follow-up to the Dutch referendum on the association agreement with Ukraine, held 2 days ago.

I must be honest: I had hoped for a more positive outcome, but we must face the result in all openness, and ratification cannot simply proceed regardless. All I can say at present is that the Dutch government will deliberate on the outcome and enter into a discussion with our parliament.

We will also consult with our European partners and Ukraine. This process will take time. We need to find a solution that is acceptable to all parties.

In the meantime we will continue the work on the agenda we have set for our Presidency. We're now at the half-way point. And let me assure you we have plenty of energy left for the next 3 months.

Allow me to provide a brief 'mid-term review' by discussing 3 priorities with you today. Firstly, the most pressing issue – clearly – is bringing the migration flows under control. I'd estimate that, for me personally, this has taken up more than 3 quarters of my time in recent months. The same goes for my colleagues in other capitals, I'm sure.

But I'm cautiously optimistic that we are seeing the emergence of a joint European approach that will allow us to regain control of our borders. The implementation of the deal we struck with Turkey remains key.

This week was crucial, as it marked the first readmissions from Greece to Turkey and the first resettlements from Turkey to Germany, Finland and the Netherlands. There's still work to be done: we need to help Greece in streamlining its asylum processes and providing temporary reception on the islands that meets humanitarian standards.

We need to work with Turkey to improve the living conditions of all refugees. And we need to ensure that all member states participate very soon in the EU's resettlement efforts. I call on all of you to rally support in your parliaments back home.

We also need to assist countries in the region, like Jordan and Lebanon, in coping with the pressure on their societies and providing adequate humanitarian relief to refugees. We need to strengthen our external borders. And we need to carry on working towards equitable burden-sharing within Europe, through relocation and continuing talks on the future of our asylum policy.

Secondly, it's important that we keep focusing on growth and jobs through innovation. We are seeing a gradual return of economic growth in Europe. But this growth is uneven and too many people, especially young people, are still unemployed.

So I want to dedicate the second half of our Presidency largely to our economic future: the deepening of the single market. The European

Parliament has calculated that we could add 1.25 trillion euros to the European economy by creating a fully functioning single market. That's twice the size of the Dutch economy, added to European prosperity on an annual basis. It would mean millions of decent, future-oriented jobs in sectors like digital transformation, smart industry and services.

We need to agree on a joint agenda to make this a reality. Here again, I urge you to support this goal when you return to your national parliaments.

Our third and perhaps our most important objective in the context of today's meeting is to connect with civil society. As parliamentarians this is your core business.

To make this happen, we need national parliaments to be more involved in European decision-making. Directly, by enhancing the use of yellow and orange cards, and by exploiting the full potential of your structured dialogue with the European Commission. And indirectly, by involving national parliaments more in determining a member state's position at national level. In the Netherlands at least, parliament is certainly up to this task. I see that for myself in the run-up to every European Council.

To summarise, the Dutch Presidency is calling for your help. First, I invite you to work at home to bolster support for a joint European solution to the pressing issue of migration. Second, I invite you to join in unleashing the full potential of our single market, generating much-needed jobs and economic growth for our citizens. And third, I invite you to continue having discussions as useful as today's. Because building strong alliances between national parliaments is essential for a legitimate and well-functioning European Union.

Thank you.



F

**Nota de Enquadramento sobre Exportação Europeia de Armas**

Deputy Chief Executive

Brussels, 1 April 2016

## **Workshop C – European Arms Exports**

### **Background paper**

**Interparliamentary Conference for CFSP/CSDP, The Hague, 7 April 2016**

Europe has a very fragmented defence industry supporting the various national Ministries of Defence in their aim to acquire and field capabilities, be they for national purposes or multinational operations in an EU, NATO, UN or other framework.

No one questions the legitimate demands that Member States have on the basis of national security and sovereignty, and in the wider context, European security.

But Member States – irrespective of their size – are all struggling to square the circle of the exponential rise in the cost of developing and producing defence equipment and squeezed defence budgets on the other. Furthermore, they face the twin challenges of a still fragmented industrial base that is characterised by overcapacity on the one hand; and fragmented demand driven by national thinking on the other.

Industry, for its part, is suffering from the absence of major new European defence programmes and thus becoming increasingly reliant on the export market outside Europe. This often leads to transfer of technology, the consequence of which could be that today's buyers will become tomorrow's competitors.

The bottom line is that no Member State – even the larger ones such as France and the UK – is able single-handedly to acquire and support the full suite of capabilities.

There is only one way forward: more cooperation. Cooperation both between governments, and between government and industry. The stark choice facing national administrations is either cooperate to acquire capabilities; or risk losing them altogether.

Governments should cooperate better and in a more systematic way to better align requirements to fill their critical capability gaps. There are too many to mention all of them, but here are a few examples: Air-to-Air Refuelling, Satellite Communications, Precision Guided Munitions, ISTAR, and so on.

It is striking that Member States are prepared to deploy their troops shoulder-to-shoulder in operations; but not to cooperate to give those troops the interoperable kit that they need to carry out that operation successfully and with minimal loss of life.

So, much stronger interdependency is needed to jointly develop future capabilities.

**An added benefit would be for Member States to adopt a genuine, and more binding, regime on security of supply, which is a prerequisite for trust and transparency. Within the EU both the Commission and EDA are working on the issue of security of supply to help Member States.**

**The capabilities of tomorrow require investment in Research & Technology (R&T) today. Yet national investment in R&T is in almost terminal decline. This has to be reversed, otherwise we will not be able to develop the systems that our troops will require in the future. The US – as ever – is taking the lead through its Third Offset Strategy. This has nothing to do with industrial participation; but everything to do with harnessing the massive strides being made in civil and dual-use technologies. Europe needs to do likewise.**

**Turning to industry, the market really needs to be made into a level playing field, one that is truly open to cross-border competition, where supply chains are also open, so that all companies – irrespective of where they are based – have a fair chance to compete.**

**But an inevitable consequence of this is that industry will have to go through major restructuring with transnational mergers to safeguard Europe's freedom of action. This is not – I repeat not – about creating a Fortress Europe, but of ensuring that when Europe needs to act, it can do so.**

**The current security climate in Europe means that doing nothing is not an option. Europe needs to get its act together to become – and remain – a credible security provider, and not just a security consumer.**

**With the US increasingly turning its attention towards the Pacific; with substantial budget cuts for defence due to the financial crisis; with the increasingly volatile security environment caused by threats from terrorism, or hybrid attacks, or cyber-attacks, the refugee crisis, not to mention conventional threats: Europe needs to wake up, and wake up now.**



**G**

***Draft da Declaração Final (14 de março)***

Place and date: The Hague, 14th March 2016  
Re: **Draft conclusions** Interparliamentary Conference CFSP/CSDP, 6-8 April 2016

*The Inter-Parliamentary Conference,*

*Having regard to the decision of the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments taken in April 2012 in Warsaw regarding the establishment and mandate of this Conference;*

*Having regard to Title II of Protocol I (and Article 9) of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the European Union;*

*Cognizant of the new powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) institutions in the area of the foreign, security and defence policy; being aware that the new instruments create better opportunities for the EU to wield an international influence commensurate with its political and economic weight;*

*Conscious of the multi-layered decision-making process in the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); aware that effective implementation of these policies must involve numerous policy actors at both the EU and national levels; conscious of the responsibility to engage in parliamentary scrutiny at the respective levels and enhance interparliamentary cooperation in the areas of CFSP and CSDP;*

*Aware that the evolution of the international scenario has strengthened the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises;*

*Building on the conclusions of the last Interparliamentary Conference ('IPC' hereafter), held in Luxembourg on 5-6 September 2015;*

### **Strategic review of the EU foreign and security policy**

1. Takes note of the state of play regarding the strategic review of the CFSP and CSDP, to be resulted in the EU's new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy by June 2016 ('Global Strategy' hereafter); welcomes the contributions of parliaments following the last IPC in Luxembourg, through which parliaments take up their role in shaping the Global Strategy; in this regard the IPC commends the High Representative for her commitment to involve all contributions and comments in the strategic review process;
2. Stresses the need to design a common, comprehensive and consistent Global Strategy that addresses the EU's challenges and opportunities in a changing international environment; cooperation, commitment and active engagement by all relevant actors, in particular by the EU Member States is requisite for a Global Strategy capable of acting in the best interest of the EU and its Member States;



by exploring the effective use of all external action instruments and policies, the Global Strategy should ensure the safety of our citizens, our societies and our territory and, moreover, it should advance our interests notably on rules-based global governance with respect for peace, democratic values and human rights; believes that the comprehensive approach and the consistent and coordinated use of the EU's external and internal policy instruments should be at the core of the new strategy;

3. States that the core strategic interest of the Union is a peaceful multilateral global order based on the rule of law, the respect for human rights and democracy; acknowledges with grave concern that these norms and values have become under increasing pressure in an increasingly unstable world;
4. Looks forward to the presentation of the Global Strategy in June 2016 and wishes to be kept involved in further discussions, including the follow-up on its implementation and the possible White Paper on security and defence emanating from the Global Strategy;

### **Strengthening EU defence and rapid response**

5. Stresses that, in light of the fragile situation on the Eastern and Southern borders of the EU, and in light of Article 42.3 of the Treaty on European Union (hereafter: TEU) (Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities), a strengthening of the EU's defence is needed; therefore calls on the EU Member States to put into practice the instruments provided for under the TEU, such as Article 42.6 (Permanent Structured Cooperation) and Article 44 (on the implementation of a CSDP task by a group of Member States); underlines the need to strengthen the EU's rapid reaction capacities, in particular by overcoming the obstacles, by defining possible solutions to the EU Battlegroups' deployment as initial-entry force and by establishing a permanent EU military headquarter (OHQ) which coordinates its work closely with the already existing Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC);
6. Calls on the European Commission to base the suggested European Defence Action Plan on the possible EU White Book on Security and Defence; regrets that so far the Commission has as yet involved neither the European Parliament nor the national parliaments in developing such an additional action plan; calls urgently on the Commission to clarify the intended legal basis for financing defence research and financing defence equipment for third countries and third regional organizations;

### **Strengthening synergy within the EU and with external partners**

7. Believes that in order to gain more credibility as a global security and foreign policy actor, the EU should take greater responsibility and focus on filling the security vacuum in its neighbourhood; calls on the HR and the EU Member States to use the Global Strategy as an instrument for clarifying and strengthening the Union's neighbourhood policy; is convinced that it is in this respect crucial to recreate a sense of solidarity within the Union and to link in a much more direct sense its responses to the East and the South; considering the relationship between external and internal security the IPC emphasizes the need for the EU to address the threats emanating from the instability in the South and in the East through an integrated approach connecting all internal and external security policies and instruments to address both the root causes and the current negative consequences of the conflict in its neighbourhood; is convinced that the EU should be more engaged with de-escalatory diplomacy especially in the Southern neighbourhood; encourages, in that context, intensified coordination between the actors and institutions responsible for the external and internal policies in the EU, increased cooperation between the EU, NATO and the UN and more civil-military synergy in relation to maritime, border and cyber security;



## Foreign policy aspects of migration

8. Urges the EU Member States to continue working on the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration presented by the European Commission, stressing in particular the need to secure the EU's external borders and to prevent further losses of lives, to dismantle smugglers' networks, and to implement a common asylum policy based on solidarity and a fair burden sharing;
9. Emphasizes the need to address the root causes of migration in the main countries of origin and transit; takes note of the inter-related issues of migration, peace-building and development and welcomes the decision of the EU to strengthen development cooperation with third countries to address the common challenges;
10. Underlines that the cessation of the conflict in Syria and the stabilisation of the wider MENA region are crucial for addressing the root causes forcing people to flee and thereby reducing migratory flows into the EU; stresses that a sustainable solution to the Syrian crisis needs to be based on an inclusive, Syrian-led political settlement involving all relevant national and international stakeholders; calls on all sides to maintain the conditions necessary for the continuation of peace talks, as provided for in the roadmap adopted by the International Syria Support Group on 14 November 2015; reiterates the importance of getting all regional and international powers behind the efforts to reach a political agreement, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Russia; calls on the EU to use its leverage over these actors in order to build support for a sustainable political settlement;
11. Recalls that it is crucial to further reinforce the cooperation between the EU and countries of origin and transit, in order to fight smuggling and trafficking networks, ensure capacity building in the fields of asylum systems and border control, provide protection for people in need, establish frameworks for safe and legal migration, and put into force a humane and effective return policy for irregular migrants; strongly supports the agreement on an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan to contain the migratory flows towards the EU and the assistance to Turkey and other countries in the region to continue hosting refugees; calls on Turkey to implement its commitments under the Joint Action Plan and to step up its efforts to prevent irregular migration into the EU;
12. Welcomes the substantial financial pledges for humanitarian aid made during the London donors' conference on 4 February 2016; looks forward to the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul on 23-24 May 2016;

## Arms exports control

13. Acknowledges the EU Common Position on arms exports (2008/944/CFSP) as the legally binding common framework for national arms exports decisions; urges the EU Member States to fully respect the eight criteria of the Common Position; deplores the fact that EU Annual Arms Exports Reports are published with ever longer delays and that not all Member States transfer data in line with reporting obligation of the Common Position;
14. Acknowledging the fact that arms export is related to national security, states that the IPC advocates more transparency and exchange of information and best practices between Member States of the EU regarding arms exports control; endorses the 'no-undercut principle', stating that Member States should respect and adopt each other's decisions related to arms exports licences, within the framework of the UN Arms Trade Treaty and the EU common position concerning arms exports (2008/944/CFSP); takes notes of the Dual-Use Regulation being subject to change, updating and enlarging the list of goods liable to malevolent military use; expresses the view that this Regulation is to be implemented in a strict and uniform manner;





H

**Declaração Final adotada**





**Inter-parliamentary  
conferences  
Dutch EU Presidency 2016**

Place and date: The Hague, **8th April 2016**  
Re: **Final conclusions** Inter-parliamentary Conference CFSP/CSDP, 6-8 April 2016

*The Inter-parliamentary Conference,<sup>1</sup>*

*Having regard to the decision of the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments taken in April 2012 in Warsaw regarding the establishment and mandate of this Conference;*

*Having regard to Title II of Protocol I (and Article 9) of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the European Union;*

*Cognizant of the new powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) institutions in the area of the foreign, security and defence policy; being aware that the new instruments create better opportunities for the EU to wield an international influence commensurate with its political and economic weight;*

*Conscious of the multi-layered decision-making process in the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); aware that effective implementation of these policies must involve numerous policy actors at both the EU and national levels; conscious of the responsibility to engage in parliamentary scrutiny at the respective levels and enhance inter-parliamentary cooperation in the areas of CFSP and CSDP;*

*Aware that the evolution of the international scenario has strengthened the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises;*

*Underscoring that the European External Action Service (EEAS), individual Member States and the European Union Special Representative for human rights should use every available political and diplomatic opportunity to uphold the respect of human rights as a priority objective of external relations, in accordance with the 2015-2019 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy of 20 July 2015 and in keeping with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights;*

*Building on the conclusions of the last Inter-parliamentary Conference ('IPC' hereafter), held in Luxembourg on 5-6 September 2015;*

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<sup>1</sup> Notes that these conclusions have been adopted by the Inter-parliamentary Conference with the Danish delegation abstaining.



## **Strategic review of the EU foreign and security policy**

1. Takes note of the state of play regarding the strategic review of the CFSP and CSDP, to be resulted in the EU's new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy by June 2016 ('Global Strategy' hereafter); welcomes the contributions of parliaments following the last IPC in Luxembourg, through which parliaments take up their role in shaping the Global Strategy; in this regard the IPC commends the HR/VP for her commitment to involve all contributions and comments in the strategic review process;
2. Stresses the need to design a common, comprehensive and consistent Global Strategy that addresses the EU's challenges and opportunities in a changing international environment and in the context of the NATO membership of most EU states; cooperation, commitment and active engagement by all relevant actors, in particular by the EU Member States is requisite for a Global Strategy capable of acting in the best interest of the EU and its Member States; by exploring the effective use of all external action instruments and policies the strategy should clearly identify challenges to the EU, especially in major areas such as migration, anti-terrorism and safety against external aggression including hybrid warfare; the Global Strategy should advance in smooth cooperation with local and regional partners in line with article 21 TEU resulting in the safety of our citizens, our societies and our territory; it should advance our interests notably on rules-based global governance with respect for peace, democratic values and human rights; believes that the comprehensive approach and the consistent and coordinated use of the EU's external and internal policy instruments should be at the core of the new strategy;
3. States that the core strategic interest of the Union is a peaceful multilateral global order based on the rule of law, the respect for human rights and democracy; acknowledges with grave concern that these norms and values have come under increasing pressure in an increasingly unstable world; is of the opinion that implementation of the Minsk agreements is the pre-condition for any substantial change in the EU's stance towards Russia; supports other principles guiding the EU's policy towards Russia as it was agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council on 14 March 2016; reaffirms the strong common position of non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea;
4. Looks forward to the presentation of the Global Strategy in June 2016 and wishes to be kept involved in further discussions, including the follow-up on its implementation and the White Paper on security and defence emanating from the Global Strategy; including a framework for the security and defence research of the EU (as already initiated by a pilot project and an upcoming preparatory action) in addition to the research programmes of the EU Member States;
5. Reminds that EU enlargement has been a successful process for Europe as a whole, helping to overcome the divisions of the Cold War, contributing to peace, stability and prosperity throughout the continent, and providing an impetus to the neighbouring European countries in continuing their reforms as a prerequisite;

## **Strengthening EU defence and rapid response**

6. Stresses that, in light of the fragile situation on and outside the Eastern and Southern borders of the EU, and in light of Article 42.3 of the Treaty on European Union (Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities), a strengthening of the EU's resilience and defence capabilities is needed; therefore calls on the EU Member States to put into practice the instruments provided for under the TEU, such as Article 42.6 (Permanent



Structured Cooperation) and Article 44 (on the implementation of a CSDP task by a group of Member States); underlines the need to strengthen the EU's rapid reaction capacities, in particular by overcoming the obstacles and by defining possible solutions to the EU Battlegroups' deployment as initial-entry force, by reforming the financing system of EU operations towards fairer burden sharing with a view to establishing a permanent EU military operational headquarter within the context of the Berlin Plus arrangements, which coordinates its work more closely with the already existing Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC); and calls on those Member States that are also members of NATO to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence, which refers to the agreements made at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014; supports the complementary EU-NATO cooperation as the best formula for increasing synergies in order to achieve fast response and avoiding duplications in the process of military development, with full respect for the decision making autonomy of each party and for the possibility of autonomous CSDP action in such cases where NATO declines to act or where an EU operation is more appropriate; considers that the establishment of practical arrangements and guidelines for the future activation of the mutual assistance clause (art. 42.7 TEU) and other provisions regarding CSDP in the Treaty should be a priority;

7. Calls on the European Commission to base the suggested European Defence Action Plan on the EU White Book on security and defence; regrets that so far the Commission has as yet involved neither the European Parliament nor the national parliaments in developing such an additional action plan; calls urgently on the Commission to clarify the intended legal basis for financing defence research and financing defence equipment for third countries and third regional organizations;

#### **Strengthening synergy within the EU and with external partners**

8. Believes that in order to gain more credibility as a global security and foreign policy actor, the EU should take greater responsibility and focus on filling the security vacuum in its neighbourhood; calls on the VP/HR and the EU Member States to use the Global Strategy as an instrument for clarifying and strengthening the Union's neighbourhood policy; is convinced that it is in this respect crucial to recreate a sense of solidarity within the Union and to link in a much more direct sense its responses to the East and the South; considering the relationship between external and internal security the IPC emphasizes the need for the EU to address the threats emanating from the instability in the South and in the East through an integrated approach connecting all civilian and military, internal and external security policies and instruments to address both the root causes and the current negative consequences of the conflict in its neighbourhood; is convinced that the EU should be more engaged with de-escalatory diplomacy;
9. Stresses the need to strengthen the forecasting and analytical capacities in EU institutions and Member States by making EU crisis prevention and management instruments more efficient and effective; underlines the increasing security challenges and threats posed by terrorism and stresses the need to improve cooperation and information sharing between European intelligence services, national counter-terrorism experts and other authorities; urges all Member States to comply with their legal obligation to share intelligence with Europol and Eurojust in the fight against terrorism and organised crime; stresses the need for measures to be directed towards the prevention of radicalization; is of the opinion that the EU must be proactive in strengthening cooperation with external partners in unified international efforts in the fight against terrorism; emphasizes the real continuum between internal and external security of the European Union and its Member States; therefore urges the European Parliament to adopt, and



each national parliament to transpose, the Directive on Passenger Name Records (COM(2011)32 of 2/2/2011) as soon as possible, in order to contribute effectively to limiting the freedom of movement of terrorists, a primary condition for improving security, urgently demanded by the citizens of Europe;

10. Encourages, in that context, intensified coordination between the actors and institutions responsible for the external and internal policies in the EU, increased cooperation between the EU, NATO and the UN and more civil-military synergy in relation to maritime, border and cyber security; calls on the EU Member States to coordinate and speak with one voice on these issues in all relevant multilateral fora; encourages the EU to further engage with neighbouring countries in security dialogue and practical cooperation in the field of CSDP; in this context, the EU should also invest in strengthening further its existing partnerships by using each Member State's added value and good relations with particular countries; stresses that to ensure the EU's relevance as a global actor and to defend and promote its own values a strong relationship between diplomacy tools and capabilities to conduct military operations is needed;

### **Foreign policy aspects of migration**

11. Urges the EU Member States to continue working on the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration presented by the European Commission, stressing in particular the need to implement the short and long term priorities in order to manage migration in a sense of shared responsibility between EU Member States and non-EU countries of transit and origin of migrants; urges the EU Member States to continue working to secure the EU's external borders and to prevent further losses of lives, to dismantle smugglers' networks, including by destroying their boats and equipment, to deliver on relocation and resettlement and to implement a common asylum policy based on solidarity and on the arrangements for a fair burden sharing among the Member States; emphasizes the importance of communication both inside and outside the EU on the issue of migration; underlines the importance of cooperation among the EU and the non-EU countries of origin implementing readmission agreements; welcomes the announced revision of the Dublin Regulation; calls on the VP/HR to increase her visibility in addressing foreign policy aspects of migration;
12. Emphasizes the need to address the root causes of migration in the main countries of origin and transit; takes note of the inter-related issues of migration, peace-building, respect for human rights and development, stressing the importance of a global and common approach through regional and bilateral strategies addressing both economic and technical cooperation, including assistance to governance and economic development of countries of origin; welcomes the decision of the EU to strengthen development cooperation with third countries to address the common challenges and encourages, in this respect, EU Member States to offer full support to the 2030 Agenda for Development and to put the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the heart of the Global Strategy;
13. Underlines that the cessation of the conflict in Syria and the stabilisation of Libya as well as the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are crucial for addressing the root causes forcing people to flee and thereby reducing migratory flows into the EU; stresses that a sustainable solution to the Syrian crisis needs to be based on an inclusive, Syrian-led political settlement involving all relevant national and international stakeholders; calls on all sides to maintain the conditions necessary for the continuation of peace talks, as provided for in the roadmap adopted by the International Syria Support Group on 14 November 2015 and in conformity with the UN Security Council resolutions 2268 and 2254;





reiterates the importance of getting all regional and international powers behind the efforts to reach a political agreement, avoiding concessions that might endanger the very sought objectives and EU values; calls on the EU to use its leverage with all relevant stakeholders in order to build support for a sustainable political settlement;

14. In consideration of the strategic nature of the EU's partnership with Egypt for common security, calls on the Egyptian authorities to ensure full respect of human rights, in order to actively prevent torture and to cooperate in shedding light on the case of the Italian researcher who was abducted, tortured and murdered in Cairo;
15. Recalls that it is crucial to further reinforce the cooperation between the EU and countries of origin and transit, in order to fight smuggling and trafficking networks, ensure capacity building in the fields of asylum systems and border control, provide protection for people in need, focusing on the most vulnerable groups, establish frameworks for safe and legal migration, to seek collective solutions and put into force a humane and effective return policy for irregular migrants in compliance with European and International Law, the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the protection of human rights; supports the agreement on an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and international law to contain the migratory flows towards the EU and the assistance to Turkey and other countries in the region to continue hosting refugees; calls on Turkey to implement its commitments under the Joint Action Plan and to step up its efforts to prevent irregular migration into the EU, consistent with the highest standards of democracy, rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression; bears in mind that the refugee crisis is not only a European but also an international challenge, which requires cooperation of the Union with key international partners such as the United Nations; takes note of NATO's surveillance mission in the Aegean Sea; commends the proposal to establish a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, while highlighting the need to adapt the concept of the European Border and Coast Guard to the new state of play in migration management, following the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan;
16. Notes with concern that the irregular migration flow from Libya towards Europe is increasing again and urges EU Member States to engage in a dialogue with the Libyan Government of National Accord on how to reduce the flow of migrants; welcomes in this context, the establishment of the new Libyan Government of National Accord in Tripoli and looks forward to its rapid take-up of duties; reaffirms the territorial integrity of Libya as a precondition for peace and stability in the whole country; reaffirms the need to step up efforts to counter Daesh's expansion in Libya, which represents a primary threat for the security of the entire European Union; emphasizes the key role of the UN Security Council's essential decisions to launch EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA to a full operational capacity;
17. Welcomes the establishment of the EU Trust Funds and the substantial financial pledges for humanitarian aid made during the London donors' conference on 4 February 2016; looks forward to the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul on 23-24 May 2016; and calls upon the EU and Member States to meet UN development aid targets to help address the migration crisis at source;

#### **Arms exports control**

18. Acknowledges the EU Common Position on arms exports (2008/944/CFSP) as the legally binding common framework for national arms exports decisions; urges the



EU Member States to fully respect the eight criteria of the Common Position; deplores the fact that EU Annual Arms Exports Reports are published with ever longer delays and that not all Member States transfer data in line with reporting obligation of the Common Position;

19. Considers that the EU should promote international cooperation on non-proliferation and arms control; underlines the need to ensure compliance and monitoring by Member States of the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports so that regimes that routinely violate human rights are not supplied with additional tools to suppress dissent;
20. Acknowledging the fact that arms export is related to national security, states that the IPC advocates more transparency and exchange of information and best practices between Member States of the EU regarding arms exports control; endorses the 'no-undercut principle', stating that Member States should respect and adopt each other's decisions related to arms exports licences, within the framework of the UN Arms Trade Treaty and the EU common position concerning arms exports (2008/944/CFSP); takes notes of the Dual-Use Regulation being subject to change, updating and enlarging the list of goods liable to malevolent military use; expresses the view that this Regulation is to be implemented in a strict and uniform manner;
21. Urges the European Commission to focus on the prevention of the proliferation of cyber-weapons that could be used against the EU's security; stresses the need to significantly increase the Member States' cyber defence capabilities; considers that the European Defence Agency may improve the coordination with the Member States in the cyber defence field;

#### **The role of parliaments**

22. Stresses the need - in a time when external and internal security are intertwined as never before - to further strengthen the cooperation between the European Parliament and EU national parliaments in the field of CFSP/CSDP and asks the Troika to come up with concrete and practical proposals for the next IPC in Slovakia in September 2016 to that purpose.



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**Relatório Clingaendel**

# The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Cooperation

Anne Bakker  
Margriet Drent  
Lennart Landman

Clingendael Report



**Clingendael**

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April 2016

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


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# The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Cooperation

## Introduction



The role of parliaments is a neglected factor in the development of European defence cooperation. This is clearly in need of rectification as parliaments have a crucial role in making deeper defence cooperation a success. In most of the EU member states, the elected representatives decide about planning, procurement, the deployment of troops and the budget allocated to defence. The 2016 Netherlands EU Presidency therefore devoted a seminar to this issue, organised by the Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' on 14-15 March in Amsterdam. High-level panels and a mixed audience of parliamentarians, national and European officials, members of think tanks, the military and academics discussed 'The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Cooperation'.

This Clingendael Report addresses a number of issues discussed at the seminar. The first section reflects the crucial role that parliamentarians have in bringing politics back into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). They are key to creating a political narrative on the importance of defence, defence cooperation and sovereignty understood as 'the ability to act'. The second section is devoted to the need to defend defence in parliament and towards the general public. Besides a small circle of dedicated parliamentarians, knowledge about and support for defence are not widespread in the European and national parliaments. The third section underlines

the need for more transparency from governments towards parliaments on defence cooperation. The Report's final section is devoted to the interparliamentary dimension that needs strengthening and looks into the workings of the Interparliamentary Conference and the parliamentary dimension of cluster cooperation.

This Clingendael Report highlights the main topics that were debated at the seminar, but does not attempt to reflect all points of the discussion. It is therefore neither a verbatim record nor a summary of the debate. Rather, it lists key issues which need to be addressed for parliaments to play a role in the deepening of defence cooperation. The Report concludes with a number of recommendations for the way forward. The Clingendael Institute bears sole responsibility for the contents of this report.

### **Bring politics back into CSDP**

Despite its ambitious origins and despite the repeated underlining of the importance of the EU as a security provider, CSDP has in recent years lost its political appeal. CSDP has become an almost impenetrable and technical policy area that is discussed in increasingly smaller circles of 'insiders'. While de-politisation is a well-known phenomenon in the process of European integration, for CSDP to move forward it first needs to be brought back to the political arena. Security and defence are issues at the heart of the European integration process and a core responsibility of member states. Treating them only as a policy which needs technical tweaking will result in CSDP and defence cooperation further losing political guidance and momentum. First and foremost national parliamentarians, but also the members of the European Parliament, have to play a role in creating a trans-European politics of defence. The Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy and its implementation provide an ideal opportunity to put the EU's security and defence role high on the political agenda. Parliamentarians should clarify the strategy in public debates and defend the political choices that arise from it to their own electorate but also cross-border in other member states.

### **A political narrative**

A trans-European politics of defence should breed a political narrative to communicate the importance of defence and European defence cooperation. It should also integrate defence with other areas such as maritime policy, border security, industry, research and technology and so forth. Such a narrative can be structured around three observations on European defence. First, while development, preventive engagement and diplomacy are at the forefront of the European approach to security, they must be backed up by credible military forces in order to be effective in a world where power politics and the use of force are a reality. This comprehensive approach combines internal and external civilian and military elements from across sectors, making defence not a separate policy silo but one of many policy areas that are highly intertwined.

Second, Europe is too dependent on the United States for its defence. The message from Washington is clear: Europe's free-riding party is over. Europe therefore requires a more credible and autonomous defence capacity, regardless of whether one is motivated by keeping the trans-Atlantic relationship alive or by having the ability to form policies independently of the United States.

Third, while there has been under-investment in defence in most European states, the major obstacle to a credible collective European defence output is the lack of cooperation. Europe's combined defence spending is considerable, but fragmented and nationally-oriented defence efforts have led to only a marginal collective capacity with shortfalls and little 'bang for the buck'. In fact, capabilities have fallen to critically low levels, putting into question Europe's ability to conduct the operations vital to its territorial and societal security. Opposing defence cooperation by arguing that it leads to a 'loss of sovereignty' is unhelpful: having full authority over national forces means little if they are too small to address the security challenges at hand.

In fact, being unable to act would constitute a much greater loss of sovereignty than having to consult with partner countries on planning and procurement or relying on some of their capabilities for deployments. How to structure European defence cooperation can be decided on a case-by-case basis - and there are a number of models and approaches to choose from - but in any case the three observations on European defence make clear that we need significant steps forward in defence cooperation.



## Defend defence

There is a great need to engage the general public and members of parliament outside of the defence committees. Other members of parliament tend to have limited awareness of defence issues and little sympathy for defence. Defence has been isolated from other policy areas and is often the first to see its budgets cut, typically without adequate consideration of the implications for the capabilities and effectiveness of the armed forces. Convincing these MPs of the importance of defence, defence cooperation, and stable budgets is not easy, but needs to be done. One way to do this is to increase the interlinkage between various committees touching upon aspects of defence by holding joint meetings with committees on, for example, the economy, budgets, home affairs, transport or intelligence. This would expose other parliamentarians to defence issues and can generate broader support for policies.

A politics of defence should not be limited to the defence-minded

In the national context, such consensus can be further capitalised upon by setting up multi-year agreements on the purpose, policy direction and budgets for defence – as has already been done in Sweden and Denmark. These national agreements should be based on a broad consensus between stakeholders, encompassing coalition and opposition parties, governmental and non-governmental experts. Multi-year defence agreements are foremost tools to improve national defence policy, but the clarity and stability they provide also help governments to become more reliable partners for European defence cooperation.

While defence is the prerogative of the national parliaments, the European Parliament has a role to play in support of CSDP, stimulating defence research and innovation through the EU budget and through flanking EU policies. In the European parliament, the importance of defence as being broader than just a subsidiary to foreign affairs should be acknowledged by upgrading SEDE to a fully-fledged committee. This would increase SEDE's capacity to issue its own reports, arrange contacts with national parliaments, and engage with the plenary. However, the active role of the EP in supporting European cooperation should not be taken for granted; with the rise of EU-sceptic parties the EP may take on a more adverse stance. It is therefore crucial that these MEPs are engaged in debates on the need for CSDP and European defence cooperation. In addition, long-term support can be secured through the formation of a broad coalition-based agreement – across parliamentary groups – on the principal need for European defence cooperation.

Parliamentarians also need to defend defence towards the general public. Parliaments play an important role in interfacing between the necessities pointed out by policy experts and the general public. Although public polls generally show high support for the armed forces, championing defence and European defence cooperation does

not translate well into electoral votes. This problem is compounded by the rise of Euro-scepticism. Governmental and non-governmental experts can advocate European defence cooperation, but politicians need to explain its relevance to the general public. In some cases, it will require that politicians show statesmanship and defend decisions that are in the long-term interest of the nation despite being unpopular in the short term.

### Increase knowledge within parliaments

Having a political narrative is not enough to create a viable politics of defence. Parliaments need a higher level of knowledge about defence in order to make, or call for, the right decisions for an effective defence capacity. Short-term decisions on defence budgets, procurement, and international cooperation in particular need to be based on an understanding of the long-term implications they have for the armed forces, the kind of operations they can perform and the threats they can address. Since European cooperation is needed to create an effective defence capacity, parliaments need to increase their knowledge in this area. This requires a more intimate knowledge of, for example, missions, procedures, programmes and benchmarks of the EU and NATO. As armed forces are increasingly being deployed in the context of multinational operations, it is also important that parliamentarians are more aware of the implications of national decision-making for these operations, especially when caveats are imposed. It is therefore important that members of parliament pay working visits to the EU institutions and national representations in Brussels, as well as to CSDP operations. The European Parliament, because of its more intimate knowledge of CSDP, should be actively sharing information and insights with national parliaments in a structural manner. Parliaments involved in clusters or bilateral defence cooperation should regularly meet up, organise joint working visits and engage in structural information-sharing. These activities are important to generate a better understanding of mutual dependencies, increase trust in the partnership, and lessen worries about assured access to shared capabilities. Inviting commanders from partner countries to give their views should also be considered.

**Parliamentarians need to be more aware of the implications of national decision-making for operations**

### Increase transparency

Governments, as well as the European Commission, EEAS and other EU agencies, need to increase the level of information provided to parliaments and involve parliamentarians from the outset of new cooperation initiatives. Increased transparency and being

frank about the implications of defence cooperation are needed to build trust between governments and parliamentarians and to build a bridge to the general public. Following the proposal by the German R  he Commission, governments should provide regular overviews of the implications of and the obligations that come with deeper defence cooperation. These reports and the parliamentary discussions that will be held on them will contribute to a heightened understanding of the commitments and mutual dependencies that follow from deeper defence cooperation. When involving parliamentarians more and at an earlier stage of defence cooperation it is important to guard the constitutional division of roles between the parliament and the government. At the end of the day, it is governments that have the authority and expertise to shape policies and operations.

To support the independent oversight function of parliaments, members of parliament need readily available, readable and politically salient information and analysis alongside what the government supplies. Parliaments should have access to either in-house research expertise on defence or be able to commission research externally. Many parliaments have some research service in place, but often lack the funds to commission the necessary research. Budgets should be allocated to support this vital function.



### **Annual progress meeting**

Holding governments to account is one of the core tasks of parliamentarians. Consecutive European Councils that dealt with defence were not, or only partially, followed by other ministerial meetings holding member states responsible for living up to their promises. While more peer pressure from Ministers of Defence among themselves is to be welcomed, parliamentarians should step up the pressure on their governments for deeper defence cooperation. While a 'Eurozone-type' semester on defence would be the optimal option, a yearly 'Progress Meeting on Defence' could be a good interim measure. At such a meeting, parliamentarians would be able to enter into a debate with both the High Representative Federica Mogherini and possibly the Defence Minister of the country holding the EU Presidency. They would discuss the progress, or the lack thereof, in achieving the promises that the ministers have made themselves at the various Council meetings. While the Defence Minister can of course not represent all 27 Ministers, he/she could report back to the next Defence Ministerial. Such a Progress Meeting would considerably up the political stakes for ministers and help in bringing politics back into CSDP. The Progress Meetings can be a useful tool to ensure political commitment to the Global Strategy. Parliamentarians should use these meetings to make sure that the strategy is implemented and translated into actionable proposals.

### **An improved Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP**

The format of the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP needs to evolve. The biannual meetings are useful as a regular meeting place for national and European parliamentarians from Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees. However, discussions at the IPC biannual meetings tend to be rather general in nature, also due to the large and formal setting. In the case of smaller and ad hoc work sessions, there is a lack of follow-up. Therefore, the IPC format needs more flexibility, more focus and more concrete deliverables. Various flexible formats are thinkable, such as joint national and European parliamentarians' working visits to CSDP operations. Ad hoc formats, such as, for example, task forces of parliamentarians from member states and the European Parliament in which they work together on specific issues and deliver reports with concrete proposals would also be advisable. Such smaller, focused settings would be able to tackle pressing issues and produce more concrete deliverables. Moreover, it enables the involvement of a wider and varied group of parliamentarians. This improved and more effective IPC also needs a stronger institutional set-up.



## Functional and cluster interparliamentary cooperation

In a majority of the EU member states national parliamentarians have a key role in the deployment of troops. Working in multinational formations and contributing to rapid response mechanisms complicates decision-making, particularly when there is no time to lose. A very concrete measure is to not only engage in political exercises ahead of, for instance, an EU Battlegroup, where ministers are involved, but also to devise exercises in which parliamentarians get to practice their role. A case in point is the seven-nation EU Battlegroup that will be on call from July 2016. The seven parliaments should get in touch and organise such an exercise to be optimally prepared for possible deployment.

Deeper defence cooperation in small groups or clusters requires a parliamentary dimension. Modular operational cooperation or even integrated standing troop formations bring along mutual dependencies. The increasingly close cooperation between, for example, the Netherlands and Germany or between France and the United Kingdom are cases in point. These parliaments should share information on these dependencies in a systematic manner. They should consider joint defence committee sessions to bring the parliamentary dimension into line with the extent of their defence cooperation. We not only need interoperable armed forces in Europe, but also interoperable politicians.

## The way forward

Distilled from the foregoing, we have identified a number of concrete and actionable recommendations. The first recommendation is an exception in that it is not 'concrete', but it is the prerequisite for the ones that follow.

- **Foster a trans-European politics of defence**  
Parliamentarians are politicians, which makes it their job to create political narratives and to package the options and dilemmas of European defence in such a way that there is a buy-in from the public at large.
- **Organise an annual 'Defence Progress Meeting'**  
An annual meeting where the promises of governments about strengthening defence cooperation are discussed with the High Representative and possibly the Defence Minister of the country holding the EU Presidency.
- **Provide regular overviews to parliaments on defence cooperation**  
Governments should supply their parliaments with regular overviews of the implications of and the obligations that come with deeper defence cooperation.

- **Create an independent parliamentary research capacity**  
This is a condition for the independent oversight function of parliaments and for parliaments to be able to play their critical role in bringing European defence cooperation forward.
- **Organise a parliamentary exercise ahead of the EU Battlegroup for semester two of 2016**  
In addition to military preparations, political readiness across the troop-contributing countries is important for EU Battlegroups to be deployed in time or even at all.
- **Build the parliamentary dimension of defence cooperation in clusters**  
Organise regular joint defence committee meetings and start structural information-sharing with defence committees of partner countries.
- **Improve the IPC on CFSP/CSDP**  
Allow various formats with changing compositions of parliamentarians; prioritise a number of issues that result in concrete deliverables and strengthen the IPC's institutional ability to facilitate this.

